A formalised performance assessment process to improve audit committee performance in South Africa: A conceptual exploration by Morgan, I
89 Southern African Business Review Volume 14 Number 2 2010
A formalised performance assessment process to 
improve audit committee performance in South 
Africa: a conceptual exploration
I. Morgan
1A B S T R A C T
There is concern worldwide about corporate governance, director 
liability, litigations and business failures, the economic recession 
and the quality of fi nancial reporting. Owing to these factors, new 
regulations and legislation aff ecting organisations and the related 
responsibilities imposed on audit committees, it is imperative that 
the performance of audit committees and individual members be 
enhanced and sustained. The King III Report and other corporate 
governance principles specify that the board, its committees and 
individual members should be evaluated regularly, which was not 
a requirement for individual committee members in King II. This 
article examines formal guidelines and requirements to identify 
the factors aff ecting the audit committee and individual members’ 
performance, to determine whether their performance could be 
improved by formalising the assessment process and to develop a 
framework for measuring their performance. The balanced scorecard 
as a method of assessment or evaluation is examined and proposed 
to help audit committees to meet their requirements and improve 
the quality of their oversight responsibilities. This article should be 
of value to boards of directors, audit committees and regulators in 
that the contributions of a more formalised performance assessment 
process as an internal governance mechanism towards facilitating 
the professional development of audit committee members are 
demonstrated. 
Key words:  audit committees, audit committee members, best practices, audit 
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“Just as the economic crisis and unprecedented uncertainty have placed tremendous 
stress on companies, so too have the demands and pressures on audit committees and 
boards increased” (ACI 2009: 6). Today’s business environment abounds with new 
challenges and complexities, such as an increase in global competition, significant 
levels of litigation, corporate re-engineering, the worldwide economic recession 
and rapid advances in technology. These all have a significant effect on business 
risk, which, to some extent, could be mitigated by more knowledgeable members 
on audit committees (Arthur Andersen 1998: 2; Howard 1998: 1; ICAEW 2004: 2). 
Organisations such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat failed partly because of a 
lack of corporate governance, and partly through an inability to be sustainable in 
the current competitive economic environment (Munzig 2003: 1). Prince (2002: 43) 
commented on the limited ability of regulators to make visible the effectiveness of 
boards and audit committees in the light of Enron’s board and audit committee being 
considered “one of the best corporate boards in the USA”.
These significant business failures and fraudulent financial reporting, both in 
South Africa and internationally, have led to an increased demand for regulation 
(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault & Reed 2002: 38; Verschoor 2002: 4), especially 
with regard to governance, transparency, sustainability and accountability (Gaynor, 
McDaniel & Neal 2006: 874; IoD 2009b: 10–11). This increased demand for both 
regulation and guidance “to enhance corporate governance mechanisms and restore 
investor confidence in financial reporting” is reflected in the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) in 
the United States of America (USA) (Krishnan & Visvanathan 2008: 851), and in 
South Africa in the King Report on Corporate Governance (King II and III Reports) 
and the new Companies Act (Act No. 71 of 2008). The Blue Ribbon Report (1999), 
the Higgs Report (2003) and the Smith Report (2003) also suggested good practices 
for audit committees. The Blue Ribbon Committee’s (BRC) recommendations in 
the report, Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC 1999: 
20) acknowledge that “good governance promotes relationships of accountability 
among the primary corporate participants to enhance corporate performance and 
that it holds management accountable to the board and the board accountable to the 
shareholders. The oversight function is typically delegated by the full board to the 
audit committee.” The report also indicates that audit committee members should 
recognise the significance of their responsibilities and should be willing to undertake 
necessary training and professional development.
The recent economic downturn, increased demand for good corporate governance 
and accountability (Braiotta 2004: xv) and additional regulations have increased the 
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responsibilities and expectations of audit committees to provide effective oversight 
(ACI 2009: 4–6; Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth & Neal 2009: 265; DeZoort et al. 
2002: 38; Scholtz 2009: 68; Song & Windram 2004: 195; Terrell & Reed 2003: 63). In 
addition, the proliferation of corporate scandals, new legislation and stock exchange 
rules has created more complex and critical new roles and responsibilities for audit 
committees, over and above assuring financial integrity, which include overseeing 
risk management, control, compliance and ethics, governance, IT governance, 
sustainability and special investigations (Bromilow & Berlin 2005: xi–xiii; Burke & 
Guy 2002: 4; IoD 2009b: 57; Soltani 2007: 102). Engel, Hayes and Wang (2009: 136–
137) anticipate that these factors that lead to the increased demand for monitoring 
will require a greater commitment of time and effort from committee members.
According to Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the USA, effective oversight of the financial reporting process 
depends largely on strong audit committees, and qualified, committed, independent 
and tough-minded audit committees represent the most reliable guardians of the 
public interest (Braiotta 2004: 11; Bronson et al. 2009: 265; Levitt 1998: 6). In view 
of the added responsibilities assigned to audit committees, these characteristics have 
become even more significant, although previous research has not provided any 
answers on how much of the aforementioned factors is enough to ensure effective 
committees or how their effectiveness should be measured. DeZoort et al. (2002: 
41) comment on the fact that because audit committees meet infrequently, deal 
with “complex but limited second-hand information” and have only some degree 
of knowledge of the organisation’s operations, this tends to limit the achievement of 
effective oversight. The risk of not staying abreast of the latest requirements was also 
described by Richard Thornburgh, a former US Attorney General and WorldCom 
investigator (Thornburgh 2002: 11), who expressed the view that the failure of 
WorldCom was partly due to “a number of deficiencies in the performance of the 
audit committee and the internal audit activity”. A survey conducted by the IoD in 
2006 also revealed that audit committees might not be as effective as they need to 
be (Marx 2008: 568). Beasley et al. (2009: 69–70) add insight to this by suggesting 
that “ceremonial efforts may not be closely related to how a given task is actually 
accomplished” and that they are mostly “designed to create legitimacy outside the 
organization”.
This results in the need for audit committees to improve the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms in benchmarking their performance against leading best 
practices and global trends in order to enhance their performance. In effect, audit 
committees will also need to consider their current composition, systems and structure 
and decide whether they have access to adequate resources to perform their function. 
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According to the Russell Reynolds Association survey (1997) conducted in the USA, 
“the quality of the company’s board has now become an important evaluation factor 
for institutional investors” with a possible direct link between board effectiveness, 
good corporate governance and company profits (IoD 2002: 65). The question arises 
whether benchmarking the audit committee performance by conducting formal 
performance assessments of individual members and considering the composition 
and structure of the committee could also enhance audit committee effectiveness, 
although conducting performance assessments implies a further load on their time 
commitment.
There is, however, a need to specifically identify the skills shortages and 
professional development requirements of audit committee members, which could 
only be determined by formally assessing the performance of the committee as a 
whole and of individual members in particular. The research on which this article is 
based proposes the implementation of a formal performance assessment process for 
individual audit committee members as an internal governance mechanism to improve 
the performance of committees and their members in South Africa. The assessment 
of individual committee members has in fact recently become a requirement of 
the King III Report, although self-assessments have been recommended. The 
background and aim of the research and the research methodology are provided 
in the next sections of the article, after which the literature review, conclusion and 
recommendations are presented. A summarised example of the proposed framework 
for performance assessment is provided in Figure 5. For a complete version of the 
framework, the author could be contacted.
Background
South Africa has to contend with the problem that many audit committee members 
do not possess the necessary skills, knowledge and experience to act as audit 
committee members and perform their duties optimally (Cascarino & Van Esch 
2005: 179; Hattingh 2000: 2; Njunga 2000: 8). There is also an apparent lack of 
available non-executive directors (NEDs) with the required business acumen and 
accounting background who are willing to serve on audit committees (Krishnan & 
Lee 2008:5; Wixley & Everingham 2002: 20). Linck, Netter and Yang (2008: 3292) 
claim that the increased time commitment, having to meet the ‘independence’ and 
‘financial literacy’ requirements as well as the associated risk involved in serving on a 
board, cause candidates to be more reluctant to accept such a position. Mike Bourne 
(Business Day 2005: 2), Professional Practice Director of national audits at Ernst & 
Young, contends that it is difficult to find people with the required skills, experience 
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and time to make audit committees work effectively. This challenging situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that the more experienced audit committee members tend to 
serve on too many audit committees, which could affect their time commitment and 
their contribution.
According to Temkin (2006: 1), there are approximately 1400 audit committee 
positions to be filled in about 685 companies listed on the JSE Limited. The apparent 
lack of available NEDs with the required skills and experience to serve on audit 
committees has been exacerbated by the requirement of the South African government 
that the audit committees of widely held companies consist only of independent 
NEDs under the Corporate Laws Amendment Act (Act No. 24 of 2006), and that 
the audit committees of widely owned public companies have at least two members 
who are NEDs and who must act independently (National Treasury 2006: s 269A). 
This is similar to the recommendation in the King II Report, which speaks of “a 
majority of independent NEDs” (IoD 2002: 39; Temkin 2006: 1). However, the King 
III Report and the new Companies Act now require that all listed and state-owned 
companies must establish an audit committee comprising at least three members 
and that all members should be independent NEDs, and all other companies should 
establish an audit committee (IoD 2009b: 57; Companies Act No. 71 of 2008: 174). 
The King III Report further recommends that members should have the necessary 
level of financial literacy, although not for individual members but collectively (IoD 
2009b: 58). 
The results of the survey conducted by Ernst & Young in 2005 suggest that 
continuing education for audit committee members in South Africa “is an area that 
needs significant improvement if they are to stay in line with best practice and keep 
up-to-date with technical developments”. Another significant concern raised from 
this research was that audit committees might not have had recent education with 
regard to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the Companies 
Act (Ernst & Young 2005: 9). This matter will be complicated further in meeting 
the requirements of the King III Report in terms of sustainability, IT governance, 
risk management and corporate law for audit committee members to be sufficiently 
proficient in these matters (IoD 2009b: 57).
In 2004 Thayer pointed out a debate on whether a ‘standard’ should be introduced 
for non-executive board members in terms of their qualifications, such as a 
requirement that they possess a professional qualification similar to that of a chartered 
accountant (Thayer 2004: 2). This is similar to a recommendation by Prince (2002: 
44) for a “more formal board certification process model”. Thayer (2004: 2) further 
commented that a curriculum, similar to that for the qualification of Chartered 
Director in the United Kingdom (UK), was already being developed in conjunction 
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with the Institute of Directors (South Africa). This situation has complicated the 
selection and recruitment process for new members and has created awareness that 
the composition and structure of the committee should be reconsidered.
Aim of the research
The aim of the research was to contribute to the literature on audit committee 
effectiveness by examining formal guidelines and requirements in this regard 
with the objective of developing a framework for assessing their performance and 
that of individual committee members. A secondary objective was to determine 
the factors affecting audit committee effectiveness that should be included in this 
framework. A limitation of the research is that it did not examine the enforcement 
or implementation of existing practices and requirements (such as the King III 
Report), which is a topic for further anticipated research. A recent study conducted 
by the Audit Committee Institute (ACI) in the UK reflected that just over half of the 
audit committee respondents indicated that a performance assessment of individual 
committee members would only ‘improve somewhat’ the overall effectiveness of the 
audit committee, but no reason was advanced for this result, nor were any measures 
suggested to improve their effectiveness (ACI 2008: 7). The King II Report required 
that “board committees should be subject to regular assessments by the board to 
ascertain their performance and effectiveness” (IoD 2002: 69), whereas the King III 
Report now specifically requires that the “evaluation of the board, its committees 
and individual directors should be performed every year” to improve board 
performance and effectiveness (IoD 2009b: 44). There was previously no mention 
of the assessment of individual committee members, and the King III Report now 
recommends self-assessment as the method for evaluating the performance of the 
board and its committees. Interviews with audit committee members from a study 
by Spira (2002: 53, 175) indicated that members generally believed that they had 
executed their responsibilities effectively, which is an indication of the need for more 
objective measures and methods of assessment. A study by Van der Nest (2008: 175) 
on audit committees in the South African public service concluded that the majority 
of audit committees were not perceived to be ineffective but that they could improve 
their effectiveness in all key areas. The question raised is whether the requirement 
that individual audit committee members be evaluated in terms of performance 
is necessary to realise the benefits of improved effectiveness and whether the 
formalisation of the assessment process is required.




Based on the aim of the research, a review of the literature supported by secondary 
empirical studies was conducted. A literature review was performed to identify the 
performance assessment methods and practices followed and prescribed in the various 
corporate governance codes, practices and guidelines, and to determine the factors 
affecting audit committee effectiveness. The literature comprised articles published 
in accredited journals, articles in popular publications, master’s and doctoral theses 
and industry frameworks, guidelines and regulations. Data were consulted from 
research conducted by the Institute of Directors (IoD), Ernst & Young (South Africa), 
KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (ACI) and Audit Committee Forum (ACF), 
and Deloitte (Ferreira 2007) in terms of the composition, structure and performance 
assessment process of the audit committee. Ernst & Young conducted an audit 
committee benchmarking survey in 2005 among audit committee members in South 
Africa, and KPMG’s ACI undertook an international survey during 2005, 2006 and 
2008 among ACI members in the Americas, Europe, South Africa, Asia, Australia 
and other unspecified countries (Ernst & Young 2005; ACI 2006; ACI 2008). The 
results of the reports from the research consulted were analysed to integrate the 
findings into the literature review and existing guidance in order to determine the 
requirements for the evaluation of individual audit committee members and whether 
such assessments could improve the performance of the audit committee as a whole.
Literature review
Performance assessment to measure audit committee
eff ectiveness
Most organisations are trying their utmost to optimise all their activities, including 
those performed by audit committees, and according to Abbott, Park and Parker (2000: 
55), it has become “important to develop more specific measures of audit committee 
effectiveness”. In 2006 Gendron and Bédard argued that there had been a considerable 
increase in and expectation of publicly demonstrated performance through objective 
measures (Gendron & Bédard 2006: 213). Concern about director liability is further 
justification for increased monitoring of audit committee effectiveness (Abbott et al. 
2000: 56). Song and Windram (2004: 196), however, recognised the lack of objective 
measures as a limitation of previous studies on the effectiveness of audit committees. 
DeZoort et al. (2002: 41) define an effective audit committee as follows: “An 
effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority and resources to 
protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal controls, 
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and risk management through its diligent oversight efforts.” However, numerous 
factors affecting the performance of audit committees need to be addressed in order to 
optimise their effectiveness and achieve their objectives. To improve the performance 
of audit committees and identify inefficiency and opportunities in order to enhance 
effectiveness, audit committees should adopt global best practices in meeting their 
financial oversight and governance responsibilities (Leblanc Diagnostics 2005: 6). 
Performance assessments should therefore be carried out to determine the individual 
members’ contributions, skills and knowledge. The effectiveness of audit committees 
could then be improved by benchmarking their performance against best practices 
of other audit committees. Benchmarking is defined as a continuous process of 
comparing or measuring performance and practices against the performance of 
organisations in a similar industry or organisations recognised as industry leaders 
(Harvey 2004). 
Source: Adapted from ACI (2003b: 5)
Figure 1: Elements of audit committee oversight
Figure 1 depicts the important elements of audit committee oversight, reflected as 
a pyramid, representing the suggested flow of information in the oversight function 
of the audit committee to ensure that their objectives are achieved. It illustrates 
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(performance evaluation) and education, at the same time adhering to the principles 
of corporate governance within the framework of their monitoring responsibilities. 
This requires individual assessments of audit committee members and not only an 
evaluation of the audit committee as a whole. All the elements should contribute to 
receiving “the right information, at the right time, from the right individuals, and 
in the right context to provide effective oversight” by the audit committee within 
the corporate governance framework (ACI 2003b: 5). The framework illustrates the 
importance of continuous improvement of performance in order to report effectively 
to all stakeholders.
After comparing the audit committee’s performance with best practices of other 
audit committees, input could also be obtained from the chairperson of the board of 
directors, senior management, the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) and the external 
auditor with regard to the committee’s efficiency and effectiveness. According to 
Burke and Guy (2002: 246), the main purposes of obtaining this information on 
the audit committee’s performance are firstly, to appraise the current status and 
performance of the audit committee in terms of their duties, responsibilities and 
activities as reflected in their charter; and secondly, to ascertain where the audit 
committee should be, after comparison with leading best practices and also with 
reference to the audit committee charter. The objective is to indicate the resources 
needed to achieve the objectives and execute the functions of the audit committee 
and to identify any shortcomings or obstacles in progressing from their current 
performance to the required performance. A final objective should be to develop 
a proposed action or strategic plan and set a timetable for the required changes as 
well as the people responsible for each activity and to present these findings and 
recommendations on the improvement of audit committee performance to the board 
of directors (Burke & Guy 2002: 246).
Wilkinson (2006: 12) contends that although conducting board, committee 
and director performance assessments is generally considered to be difficult, the 
process of performance assessment has the benefit of being the most effective way of 
making performance expectations clear, and clarifies whether board or committee 
composition is appropriate and whether members should be reappointed (IoD 
2009b: 44). This suggests that individual assessments should be conducted. It also 
improves relations between the board, committees and management and prevents 
powerful personalities from exercising overall control and evading checks and 
balances. Performance assessments identify not only strengths and weaknesses but 
also shortcomings in the professional development and education of audit committee 
members (IoD 2009b: 44). It is therefore evident that performance assessment is 
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a vital factor in enhancing the performance of individual members and the audit 
committee as a whole (Wilkinson 2006: 12).
Factors or determinants of audit committee performance assess-
ment
According to Epstein, Jones and Roy (2002: 16), audit committee performance is 
dependent on factors such as the committee’s composition, systems and structure and 
the feedback received through performance assessments and the training provided 
(see Figures 1 and 2).
Certain areas or factors for assessment that could be positively linked to effectiveness 
were extracted from the recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Committee, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the King III Report and the Institute 
of Internal Auditors (IIA) with regard to the audit committee’s performance. These 
reports emphasised that boards of directors are expected to evaluate certain factors or 
areas for assessment in terms of audit committee performance (Bromilow & Berlin 
2005: 103; IIA 2005: 3; IoD 2009b: 56–68; PWC 2005: 14; Wixley & Everingham 2002: 
51). Figure 2 shows the effect of these factors on the audit committee’s performance 
and ultimately the company’s overall performance (corporate performance) (Epstein 
et al. 2002: 6). Levy (1993: 60) demonstrated the synergy between the oversight 
responsibility of audit committees and the improvement in corporate governance. This 
correlation between audit committee performance and their governance contribution 
and corporate performance was also evident in Turley and Zaman’s (2004: 309 & 323) 
research. It demonstrates the importance of inputs and processes as well as adequate 
feedback information in order to improve the audit committee’s effectiveness. The 
only way to obtain sufficient and adequate feedback is to implement a formalised 
assessment process. Gendron and Bédard (2006: 213), however, noted the complexity 
of measuring performance in terms of corporate governance.
The critical success factors or keys regarding the ‘input’ or audit committee 
composition consist of the independence and objectivity of individual members, 
ethics, diligence, judgment, insight and tenacity, knowledge, skills and experience, 
communication skills, and the selection process for new audit committee members 
(Bromilow & Berlin 2005: 103; DeZoort et al. 2002: 42; Epstein et al. 2002: 16; IIA 
2005: 3; PWC 2005: 14; Wixley & Everingham 2002: 51). Another crucial requirement 
relating to composition is that people from “diverse and complementary backgrounds” 
(Ernst & Young 2003: 6) should be selected to serve on the audit committee, which 
could include members with a diversity of experience, and of different genders, races, 
ages and even nationalities (Gregory 2000: 12). 
A formalised performance assessment process to improve audit committee 
performance in SA
99 
Source: Adapted from Epstein et al. (2002: 6)
Figure 2: Determinants of audit committee performance
The keys with regard to the ‘processes’ or the audit committee structure consist of 
the audit committee chairperson, NEDs, diversity of skills and knowledge, the size 
of the audit committee and rotation of members (Epstein et al. 2002: 16). As early as 
2001, Gumede (2001: 38–39) suggested that some organisations select non-executive 
members as ‘token’ appointments or on the basis of their political alignment simply to 
fill vacant positions, and that this affects their ability to add value. However, research 
conducted by Ahwireng-Obeng, Mariano and Viedge (2005: 11) and reported on in 
the ‘Influences on the performance effectiveness of NEDs in South Africa’ indicated 
that only 16% of the respondents mentioned token appointments of black NEDs as 
one of the factors that influence the effectiveness of NEDs. Ahwireng-Obeng et al. 
(2005: 11) also cited the diversity of NEDs (43%), the work overload of NEDs (33%), 
the need to transform (26%) and matching expectations of the company with those of 
the NED (16%) as having an effect on the performance of audit committees.
All the factors cited by Ahwireng-Obeng et al. (2005: 11) should also be considered 
in the selection and recruitment process of audit committees. These factors 
ultimately impact on the performance of audit committees because new members, 
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in particular, have not yet acquired the necessary skills and experience to make a 
valuable contribution from the early stages of the discharge of their responsibilities 
to the committee. It is understandably difficult to meet all the requirements, adhere 
to regulations and governance principles and at the same time be able to fill the 
required vacant positions on audit committees. Some organisations often use 
representatives from stakeholders such as labour unions to be appointed as audit 
committee members. However, these members might not have received any financial 
or organisational management training prior to their appointment as audit committee 
members. Furthermore, they are often regarded as only “part-time participants in 
the company” (Bishop, Hermanson, Lapides & Rittenberg 2000: 51).
The ideal audit committee structure and composition for a company should 
therefore be determined and reviewed regularly to identify any necessary changes 
in membership. Term limits should also be addressed. Evident strengths and skills 
shortages in the composition should then be identified and corrective action taken 
(IIA 2005: 2). To ensure effective and efficient audit committee performance, the 
structure (formation, reporting structure, size and make-up) of the audit committee 
should first be established and formalised to maintain the committee’s independence. 
If the committee is to go forward, the composition of the audit committee (required 
qualifications, independence, skills sets, personal attributes and available time of 
individual committee members) should be considered, identified and formalised 
and these factors should also be considered in the selection and recruitment process 
(Ferreira 2008: 92).
Epstein et al. (2002: 16) identified the keys for the ‘processes’ or the audit 
committee systems as productivity and attendance of meetings, adequate induction 
and professional development process, information or resource availability, effective 
succession planning, open and independent communication, information flow and 
reporting systems, and effective performance assessment systems. Bromilow and 
Berlin (2005: 103) and ACI (2009: 8) report that the most effective audit committees 
also evaluate the performance of individual committee members by assessing their 
understanding of the company’s business, their understanding of and commitment to 
the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee and their willingness to devote 
the time necessary to prepare for and participate in the committee’s deliberations. The 
overall performance of the audit committee, executive sessions with management, 
the internal auditors and external auditors and the relationship, interaction and 
involvement with all the relevant parties are factors identified by Bromilow and Berlin 
(2005: 103), Epstein et al. (2002: 16), IIA (2005: 3), PWC (2005: 14) and Wixley and 
Everingham (2002: 51). The methods of evaluating these characteristics, however, 
have not been prescribed. After examining specific characteristics (as already 
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mentioned) of committee members, Abbott et al. (2000: 55) provided evidence that 
there is a direct relationship between audit committee effectiveness, as opposed to 
the mere presence of members, and the incidence of financial misstatements. Abbott, 
Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003: 20), who further researched this matter, 
suggest that “key audit committee characteristics – rather than the mere presence 
of an audit committee – critically impact the audit committee’s ability to effectively 
execute its duties”. Other research studies whose results are consistent with this show 
that the audit committee’s effectiveness is affected by these characteristics (Abbott, 
Parker & Peters 2004; Beasley et al. 2000; Carcello & Neal 2000; DeZoort & Salterio 
2001; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006:8). This implies that the characteristics of 
individual members of the audit committee could also be important in ensuring an 
effective committee.
The output or result of performance assessment would then be reflected in the 
audit committee’s effectiveness in performing this oversight function and culminate 
in the organisation’s performance. To enhance or improve the committee’s 
performance, there should be a comprehensive assessment and adequate feedback 
process to ensure that inefficiencies can be addressed either through training or by 
changing the composition of the audit committee. This process should also ensure 
that the foundation is laid for future improvement (AICPA 2004: 103; IoD 2009b: 
44). Benchmarking the monitoring role and the composition and structure of the 
audit committee enhances audit committee effectiveness (Ferreira 2008: 89–106; 
Song & Windram 2004: 196). Again, it is evident from the determinants of audit 
committee performance that individual assessments of audit committee members 
should be conducted in order to achieve the objectives of the audit committee and to 
contribute effectively to corporate performance.
According to Ernst & Young (2005: 1), adequate global benchmarks and measures 
are available for measuring audit committee performance and progress. However, 
in South Africa, the effects and implementation of the King II Report on audit 
committee performance and specifically that of individual members have not been 
clearly measured; nor have the results been reported. Mahadeva (2005: 8) indicates 
that formal board assessments, which used to be a rarity in most companies, are 
increasingly being made a requirement in the US and UK corporate arena, which 
was a specific requirement in the draft King III Report but then excluded from the 
final published King III Report (IoD 2009a: 40). This raises concerns. However, 
other regulatory bodies have also provided little guidance on how these assessments 
should be performed. Mahadeva (2005: 8) suggests that this process be customised for 
individual companies and that it should never be a case of ‘one size fits all’. The King II 
Report (IoD 2002: 27, 29) recommends that a substantial portion of executive directors’ 
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compensation be performance-based and that performance should be evaluated at 
least annually through self-assessment. The draft King III Report recommended a 
formal evaluation process and that independent performance assessments should be 
considered (IoD 2009a: 39–40), whereas the final King III Report requires that a 
“yearly evaluation should be performed by the chairman or an independent service 
provider” (IoD 2009b: 45). The method of assessment is, however, not prescribed. 
KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (ACI 2003a: 2) recommends that a well-devised 
assessment process to be conducted in an open and constructive manner in order 
to allow all the stakeholders to benefit from the individual and collective insight, 
knowledge and experience of all the audit committee members. The process should 
also determine how effectively and faithfully individuals have carried out their 
roles and responsibilities (Mahadeva 2005: 8). It should also identify the training 
needs of individual members and consider reappointing these members (IoD 2009b: 
44). However, the assessment should not simply be a checklist for compliance with 
rules and regulations – it should focus instead on evaluating the effectiveness of the 
committee and the individual audit committee members (ACF 2006: 1).
In a survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2005: 2), more than half the respondents 
indicated that the compensation paid to audit committee members in South Africa 
is proportionate to their responsibilities and the risk associated with their position. 
King II suggested that share options be granted to NEDs, subject to prior approval 
by the shareholders (IoD 2002: 27), whereas the King III Report requires that share 
options should not be granted and NEDs’ fees should be fixed at a base fee and an 
attendance fee per meeting (IoD 2009b: 49). International recommendations reflect 
a preference for the granting of shares rather than share options. 
Performance assessment methods
Research conducted by Ernst & Young in 2005 through their audit committee 
benchmarking survey indicated that one-third of the audit committees in South Africa 
did not evaluate their effectiveness. The remaining two-thirds of the respondents 
indicated that they used a combination of qualitative and quantitative means of 
assessment (Monteiro 2005: 2). This indicates that the practice of performance 
assessments is followed in some organisations but that the process is not formalised 
or regulated. Auditing Standard No. 2 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that the 
auditor “evaluate the effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight of the external 
financial reporting as well as the internal control over financial reporting” (Rossiter 
2009: 2). It will therefore be advisable for the audit committee members to evaluate 
themselves. Furthermore, a search on audit committee reports available on the 
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internet revealed that the performance assessment of individual committee members 
was not mentioned anywhere. 
KPMG’s Audit Committee Forum (ACF 2006: 1) suggests that a structured and 
formal assessment can help to ensure that the audit committee delivers on its mandate 
or charter and continuously enhances its contribution to the functioning of the board. 
Performance assessment methods, singly or in combination, could be used to evaluate 
audit committee performance, say, to obtain formal feedback from the board, the chief 
executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer (CFO), the compliance officer, 
as well as internal and external auditors. Additional assessment methods include 
completing self-assessment surveys and obtaining assessment of the contributions 
and performance of individual audit committee members by the chairperson of the 
audit committee (Auditnet 2006: 1). Monteiro (2005: 2) suggests comparing audit 
committee activities against the committee’s charter or formal written procedures 
and conducting peer reviews or comparisons. Bromilow and Berlin (2005: 101) and 
Song and Windram (2004: 196) recommend that the audit committee’s activities be 
compared with leading best practices (benchmarking), while the ACF (2006: 1) adds 
that assessments by the governance or nominating committee of the board should 
be obtained. Richards (2001: 2) proposes comparing current practices with a review 
of current literature on audit committee best practices, while Epstein et al. (2002: 3) 
suggest the use of the balanced scorecard approach. For the purposes of this article, 
the balanced scorecard approach will be further discussed, because this method has 
not yet been effectively utilised in performance assessments of audit committees.
The balanced scorecard approach as a method of assessment
Epstein et al. (2002: 3–4) suggest that the balanced scorecard approach, illustrated in 
Figure 3, is an effective method of measuring and managing corporate performance. 
They propose that it could be used in the same way to evaluate board performance 
in general. According to the author of this article, this approach could also be used to 
evaluate audit committee performance.
Epstein et al. (2002: 3–4) further indicate that the balanced scorecard is useful in 
“developing the objectives, goals, systems, and metrics to help align strategy, actions, 
and performance” with regard to the audit committee’s role and responsibilities. In 
effect, this will ensure accountability to the various stakeholders and improve corporate 
governance and transparency while also ensuring that all the dimensions of their 
responsibility will be assessed. To implement a successful performance assessment 
system, strategic objectives and critical success factors need to be identified in advance 
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for the audit committee as a whole. Internal processes and learning and growth as 
dimensions of the monitoring and evaluating process of the balanced scorecard will 
also be further explored in terms of the performance assessment process (see Figure 
4) (Epstein et al. 2002: 3–4).
Adapted from the framework of Epstein et al. (2002: 20–21), the schematic 
representation (Figure 3) shows the four dimensions of the audit committee’s 
responsibility with regard to the core values of the organisation. These are the 
governance and performance dimension, the stakeholder dimension, the internal 
business processes dimension and the learning and growth dimension.
For each of these dimensions of the balanced scorecard, the audit committee should 
identify strategic objectives, measures to accomplish these objectives and targets and 
key performance indicators (KPIs) or drivers to achieve the objectives. According to 
Ernst & Young (2004: 9), the audit committee’s value-adding activities could be 
assessed by measuring their performance against expected results. This would entail 
identifying specific decisions/dimensions deemed to be vital to the audit committee’s 
success in contributing to organisational performance (Figure 3) as well as the 
expected behaviours necessary to maintain constructive teamwork and sufficient 
balance between control and collaboration, setting target key performance indicators 
(KPIs) and measuring both the individual audit committee members’ performance and 
the team’s performance and progress against KPIs. Feedback should be given on the 
progress and results of assessment to ensure learning, growth and improvement.
The strategic objectives and performance drivers reflected in Figure 4 could be 
incorporated into Figure 3, the balanced scorecard framework for evaluating audit 
committee performance as proposed by this article. The progression or link between 
the different performance drivers starts with improving the audit committee’s skills 
and knowledge (strategic objective) through training programmes (performance 
driver), which would lead to improved audit committee processes. This would be 
followed by effective governance practices and stakeholder satisfaction, which would 
give rise to improved company performance and the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives.
The suggested balanced scorecard framework set out in Figure 5 reflects the 
best practice components of an effective audit committee, derived from the strategic 
objectives (Figure 4), to be used as a performance assessment instrument by audit 
committees and individual members in the assessment process (ACI 2002; AICPA 
2004; Apostolou & Jeffords 1990; Braiotta 2004; Burke & Guy 2002; Burrage 2003; 
IoD 2002; IoD 2009b; Steinberg 2000).



































































































































Source: Adapted from Epstein et al. (2002: 22)
Figure 4: The causal relationships in the audit committee’s balanced scorecard
The suggested framework in Table 1 consists of the following columns: the best 
practice components of an effective audit committee based on the four dimensions 
of audit committee responsibilities, and the related strategic objectives (cf. Figure 
4). For each strategic objective, performance drivers, as well as the related measure 
(evaluation by the Board) and the target (namely, the King III Report or Companies 
Act) should be determined by the committee as a whole. The effectiveness rating 
of performance, and the person responsible for addressing the follow-up steps and 
inefficiencies, should be indicated by the committee members. This is necessary 
to ensure optimal performance of the audit committee as well as of the individual 
committee members. The measures, targets, rating and follow-up steps should 
be completed by the audit committee according to their regulatory framework, 
organisational structure and specific requirements. 
y
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Table 1: Balanced scorecard framework for audit committee performance assessment
Best practice components 















•  The audit committee promotes long-
term shareholder value
 Drivers:
 •  The audit committee plays a key 
role in the areas of comprehension, 
communication and oversight 
regarding fi nancial reporting, 
internal auditing, external auditing 
and special investigations
 •  The audit committee strives to 
increase shareholders' value with 
due regard to the interests of other 
stakeholders and the committee’s 
signifi cant role
 •  Audit committee members execute 
their oversight responsibility in the 
following manner:
  –  Ensure that procedures and 
systems are in place to act 
as checks and balances on 
information received, ensuring 
preparation of annual budgets 
and forecasts against which 
performance can be monitored
  –  Obtain independent professional 
advice at the earliest opportunity, 
when necessary
•  The audit committee promotes a high 
level of corporate governance
•  The audit committee contributes 
to the long-term sustainability of 
company performance
 Drivers:
  To be developed by audit committee
STAKEHOLDERS
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:
•  The audit committee develops and 
manages appropriate relationships 
with all stakeholders
•  The audit committee demonstrates 
a high level of ethical behaviour and 
legal compliance
•  The audit committee promotes ac-
countability, transparency and risk 
management 
 Drivers:








•  Number 
of contact 
meetings












Best practice components 















•  Audit committee’s composition 
and structure contribute to the 
organisation’s performance
•  Maintaining effective processes and 
standards to execute audit committee 
oversight responsibilities
 Drivers:
  To be developed by audit committee
LEARNING AND GROWTH
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:
•  Adequate access to strategic informa-
tion and resources
•  Improving audit committee skills and 
knowledge
•  Audit committee members’ character-
istics contribute to the achievement of 
their responsibilities
 Drivers:
 •  Audit committee members display 
a commitment in terms of the 
following:
  –  Finding the time and demonstrat-
ing a commitment to performing 
their duties and responsibilities 
properly
  –  Being diligent and motivated in 
discharging their responsibilities 
by regularly attending meetings 
and contributing to the company's 
direction 
  –  Striving to increase shareholders' 
value with due regard for the 
interests of other stakeholders and 
the committee’s signifi cant role 
•  Audit committee members conduct 
their fi duciary responsibility in the 
following manner:
 –  Exercise utmost good faith, honesty 
and integrity, a high level of ethical 
standards and act independently of 
any outside fetter or instruction
 –  Always act in the best interests of 
the company and not in ‘sectoral’ 
interests
 –  Avoid confl icts of duties and inter-
ests, disclosing potential confl icts at 
the earliest possible opportunity
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Best practice components 













 –  (If need be) disagree with colleagues 
on the board, including the 
chairperson and chief executive, 
demonstrating a strong willingness 
both to question issues and to speak 
out at meetings
•  Audit committee members should 
be emotionally intelligent, confi dent, 
infl uential and have excellent inter-
active skills as well as the ability to 
handle confl ict 
•  Members should have analytical 
reasoning abilities, natural curiosity, 
a reasonable measure of healthy 
scepticism, and a willingness to devote 
the time necessary to do the job 
•  Members should have sound process 
management skills and the capacity to 
absorb a fair degree of detail
•  Audit committee members should be 
vigilant and informed, with probing 
minds, to ensure eff ective oversight of 
their responsibilities
The assessment process
The assessment process should be formalised, as was initially suggested by the draft 
King III Report (IoD 2009a: 39–40). KPMG’s ACF (2006: 2) suggests a structured 
audit committee performance assessment approach by discussing the performance 
assessment process that will be adopted, deciding who will coordinate the process and 
creating an assessment form that is accepted by all members. The approach should 
involve the following: determine who will participate in providing initial input to the 
audit committee – this will include the audit committee members and chairperson 
and possibly even the chairperson of the board, the CEO, the chairpersons of other 
board committees, the CFO, the CAE, the external auditor, the company secretary, 
in-house counsel and others who interact with the audit committee. The assessment 
forms should then be provided to all the participants and be returned to the process 
coordinator for analysis and compilation. The compiled reports should reflect each 
response and the average rating, possibly reflecting the overall average, the averages 
of the audit committee members (without losing sight of strongly conflicting views) 
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and other participants as the basis of a conversation concerning the audit committee’s 
effectiveness and areas for improvement. A final report should then be submitted to 
the board of directors on recommendations for improvement, if any, in terms of the 
audit committee charter or membership (ACF 2006: 2).
Conclusion 
The research focused, inter alia, on the increased responsibilities of audit committees, 
derived from corporate governance codes, legislation and the audit committee 
charter, and described the potential effect of performance assessments on the overall 
performance of audit committees. The research emphasised how audit committee 
performance could be enhanced through the adoption of good governance principles 
and the benchmarking of performance against global trends and best practices. 
The principles of good governance and the elements of audit committee oversight 
were considered and examined for the purpose of discovering the factors or areas of 
assessment with regard to audit committee performance in ensuring transparent and 
objective internal governance mechanisms within an organisation. The conclusion 
drawn is that formalised performance assessment processes for the individual 
members of audit committees (to enable them to comply with the increased demands 
and governance principles) have become imperative.
It was acknowledged that the responsibilities of audit committees differ from 
organisation to organisation, based on the size, structure, nature and requirements 
imposed by the board of the organisation as well as legislature. A generic 
framework as suggested in this article could be suitable for all audit committees, but 
individual frameworks should be developed and adapted within each organisation 
to accommodate the unique dynamics and environment of the organisation. The 
research examined best practices in the audit committee performance assessment 
process. In addition, the importance of establishing and maintaining a charter to 
guide the committee in achieving its objectives was suggested. The audit committee 
charter should therefore form the basis on which the audit committee and the 
individual members are evaluated.
As derived from the literature, the effectiveness of audit committees may be 
influenced by several factors, such as performance assessment, diversity of skills, size, 
rotation of members and access to support and information. Best practices in all these 
areas should be considered and applied to assist the audit committee in the effective 
performance of its responsibilities.
This study emphasised the importance of complying with the composition 
requirements and the ideal structure for the committee to ensure effective and 
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efficient performance of their oversight responsibilities. Selecting qualified and 
independent members to the audit committee will not necessarily ensure optimal 
performance. Hence the article emphasised the significance of the induction and 
professional development process of new and existing audit committee members, 
which is also evident from the balanced scorecard framework and the relevant key 
performance drivers to achieve organisational objectives.
In conclusion, the research investigated the importance of the assessment of 
individual members to improve the effectiveness of the audit committee as a whole. 
In discharging their oversight responsibilities, audit committees and individual 
members need to evaluate and improve their performance, and they should be 
empowered with the authority and necessary resources to protect stakeholder interests 
in terms of financial reporting, sustainability, internal control, risk management and 
governance processes.
Recommendations
It is suggested that from the individual audit committee appraisals, any shortcomings 
in the composition and structure of the committee in terms of knowledge and skills, 
independence or diversity could be determined. Either new members could be 
recruited or existing members could be counselled or even replaced. Any additional 
professional development requirements or resources required could also be 
identified and corrective action taken. It is therefore proposed that audit committees 
commit themselves to performance-based remuneration and that the performance 
of individuals as well as of the committee itself be reviewed regularly to enhance 
effectiveness. The effectiveness of audit committee performance also needs to be 
monitored continuously, and progress should be evaluated by means of a formalised 
process and framework, as proposed by the balanced scorecard framework. It is 
recommended that the audit committee charter form the basis of the framework and 
contain a comprehensive list of audit committee responsibilities but be customised to 
suit individual audit committees.
The current debate is whether a ‘standard’ should be introduced for non-
executive board members in terms of their qualifications, such as a requirement 
that they possess a professional qualification similar to a qualification as a chartered 
accountant. The way in which this qualification would be awarded or implemented 
is not yet clear. The author supports the implementation of such a qualification, with 
the proposal that the performance assessment process suggested in this article be 
used in the process of awarding such qualification.
I. Morgan
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Further research is envisaged on examining existing practices in terms of 
performance evaluations of audit committees, the processes followed and the 
enforcement thereof and also the probability of boards and board committees 
recognising and establishing performance as a criterion on which to base remunera-
tion.
“Real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance.” (Confucius in 
Quoteland.com 2005)
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